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Kirby: The Viability of Strict Scrutiny Review and the Doctrine of Uncon

THE VIABILITY OF STRICT SCRUTINY
REVIEW AND THE DOCTRINE OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
AFTER LYNG v.. INTERNATIONAL
UNION*
In Lyng v. International Union, UAW the United States Supreme Court held that striking union workers were not entitled to federal food stamp assistance. 2 Justice White's opinion for the Court in
InternationalUnion ignored Shapiro v. Thompson,3 a landmark equal
protection case in which the Court, presented with a remarkably similar factual scenario, held the applicants were entitled to welfare payments.4 The Thompson Court reasoned that welfare benefits could not
be denied simply because the applicant had not met the granting
state's residency requirements, since denial of benefits would have penalized the welfare applicant for having recently exercised her right of
interstate travel., International Union is troublesome, therefore, because it signals a possible retreat from the rationale of Thompson, a
retreat which could limit the use of strict scrutiny review in cases involving individual liberties.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution was intended to preserve individual liberties within the framework of a federal system of government.8
The preservation of individual liberties, however, has not been accomplished by any single constitutional provision, but by an amalgam of
doctrines including equal protection and substantive due process.7 The

* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor William S. McAninch
of the University of South Carolina School of Law for his assistance in the preparation of
this Note.
1. 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
2. Id. at 374.
3. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
4. See id.
5. Id. at 629-30.
6. See generally id. at 629 (principles of federalism and constitutionalism require
freedom to travel throughout nation without unreasonable burdens or restrictions).
7. "Substantive due process" is the name given to a judicial doctrine which arose in
the late nineteenth century and which dominated the Supreme Court's treatment of leg-
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fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no
person shall be denied equal protection of the law by any state.8 Accordingly, states must treat all similar individuals in a similar manner,
at least when no legal justification exists for disparate treatment
The doctrine of equal protection, like the doctrine of substantive
due process, has evolved during the twentieth century. Although the
doctrines were initially used primarily to protect economic rights, 10
both have been used in the latter part of this century primarily to protect individual liberties." Equal protection has been used more widely
in recent individual rights cases, 2 perhaps because of the disparagement cast upon substantive due process in the early twentieth century. 13 While substantive due process has been revived,' 4 it has not

islative regulations well into the twentieth century. The doctrine is characterized by
heightened activism in the review of legislation, for which the Court has traditionally
been criticized. Opponents of substantive due process argue that the Court should not
usurp the role of the legislature by transforming the due process clause from a guarantee
of fair procedures into a method for passing judgment on the substantive policies of
legislative regulations. C.PRITCHETT, CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES 292 (1984). Several
Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that this view also is held by some members of the
Court. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), limited by Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 1.
9. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
10. Early substantive due process cases involved economic rights, not individual liberties. See, e.g., Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869) (Legal Tender Act set
aside because Act's retroactive application deprived creditors of property without due
process of law); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) ("Dred Scott" decision)
(fifth amendment due process clause invoked to defend property against substantive legislative power); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (involving statute which made
liquor a nuisance and required owners to destroy their liquor or face criminal
prosecution).
Economic legislation also was the early focus of equal protection cases. One researcher studied the use of the doctrine and found that of 554 Supreme Court decisions
up to 1960 in which the equal protection clause was involved, 426 (76.9%) dealt with
economic legislation, while only 78 (14.2%) concerned state laws alleged to impose racial
discrimination or Congressional acts designed to end the discrimination. The remaining
cases involved miscellaneous statutes dealing with "criminal procedure, laws applicable
to cities on the basis of size, and matters equally unexciting." R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR
EQUALITY 59 (1960).
11. See, e.g., Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (in denying states the right to proscribe
abortion before third trimester, Court held right of privacy to be a due process right);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute which limited use of contraceptives to
married couples violated equal protection, since law classified persons according to marital status).
12. See generally Gunther, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (discussing emergence of the "new" equal protection during the Warren Court era).
13. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court used substantive due
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caught up with equal protection in terms of constitutional importance.

Given the Court's increased reliance upon equal protection, the International Union decision is especially startling because it seems to narrow the utility of the doctrine. This Note will analyze International
Union and its impact, but first an understanding of equal protection is
necessary. 15
A. Applicability of the Equal Protection Doctrine
The equal protection doctrine is triggered by classifications drawn by
states for the distribution of governmental benefits or burdens, under
which similarly situated individuals receive dissimilar treatment."6
Since states must treat similar individuals in a similar manner,17 classifications of individuals are scrutinized for constitutionality. A particular classification is unconstitutional unless it measures up to the appropriate standard of review, which is determined according to the
significance of the personal right allegedly infringed upon by the classification. The more significant the right implicated, the more rigorous is
the appropriate standard of review.'

process to strike down a statute that sought to protect the health of bakers by limiting
the number of hours they might work in a day or a week. Justice Peckham's opinion for
the majority asserts that the Court must look beyond legislative pretenses to the real
motives behind challenged laws, thus clearly illustrating the Court's activism at that
time. This judicial activism, however, later was criticized as being inappropriate. See,
e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) (criticizing Lochner and subsequent
substantive due process cases as "intrusion by the judiciary into the realm of legislative
value judgments"). Criticism of Lochner and similar cases caused a sharp decline in the
application of substantive due process.
14. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (right to marry, although
not expressly enumerated in the Constitution, is "implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause"); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)
("Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. . . . That
history counsels caution and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment . . .);
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (right of privacy is a due process right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (right to privacy, although not expressed in the Constitution, arises
from "penumbras" and "emanations" inherent in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
15. Even though the law challenged in InternationalUnion was federal rather than
a state statute, the principles of equal protection still apply. In InternationalUnion the
plaintiffs alleged that the 1981 amendments to the Food Stamp Act violated the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment due process clause, which restricts the
federal government in the same manner the fourteenth amendment restricts the states.
See InternationalUnion, UAW, 485 U.S. at 365.
16. See L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-7, at 1454 (2d ed. 1988).
17. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
18. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Justice Marshall, dissenting in Rodriguez, referred to a "spectrum" of equal protection standards
under which the most important rights implicate the most demanding standards. Criti-
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The standard of review dictates which party carries the burden of
proof, how important the state interest must be to sustain the classification, and how closely tailored the state action must be to the
achievement of the governmental objective. Ordinarily, the state will
not have the burden of proof in an equal protection case. When the
classification involves highly significant personal rights, however, the
standard of review is most rigorous (i.e., strict scrutiny), and the state
will have the burden of proof and must meet the standard or the law
will be declared unconstitutional. 9
A state law that penalizes the exercise of a fundamental right also
triggers strict scrutiny. 20 Such a penalty warrants the most searching
equal protection scrutiny, under which the state must provide a compelling interest in order to prevail.21 Consequently, this aspect of equal
protection remains a safeguard to protect an individual's constitutional
rights.
The Supreme Court has clearly established that "[iln determining
whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we
must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests
which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who
are disadvantaged by the classification."' 2 Courts must consider these
factors, however, in the context of an appropriate standard of review.
B. Three Standards of Review for Equal Protection Analysis
Under the equal protection clause, a statute is examined according to
one of three standards of review, "depending upon the interest affected
or the classification involved." 23 Under strict scrutiny, the most strincizing the majority, Justice Marshall stated:
The Court apparently seeks to establish ... that equal protection cases fall
into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of re-

view-strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field
of equal protection defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what
this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This
spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the
Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.
Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984).
20. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
21. Id. at 634. When strict scrutiny is invoked, the state has the burden of showing a
compelling interest justifying its action. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
22. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (footnote omitted).
23. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972) (footnote omitted).
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gent standard of review, the challenged governmental action must be
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.2 4 The government also
must prove that the action is narrowly tailored to the achievement of
that interest.25 Thus, if the government fails to show the action serves
a compelling interest, or if the challenging party offers a less burdensome alternative that achieves26 the governmental objective, the law will
be declared unconstitutional.

The Court applies strict scrutiny when a statute creates an inher-

ently suspect class 27 or penalizes the exercise of a fundamental right.28

Given the significant burden placed on the government under strict
scrutiny, it is virtually an outcome determinative test, since the law
almost certainly will be declared unconstitutional. 29 If, however, strict
scrutiny is not appropriate, the Court will apply one of two less demanding standards of review.30 In cases creating classifications for general economic or social legislation, the Court generally defers to other
branches of government, presuming actions legitimate 3 1 Thus, as long
as "[tihe state

. . .

proceed[s] upon a rational basis and [does] not re-

sort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary, the legislation is constitutional. ' 3 2 Explaining this "rational basis test," the Supreme Court
has said that "it has long been settled that a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably

24. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
25. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989); Riley v.
National Fed'n of the Blind, 108 S. Ct. 2667, 2679 (1988); United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 171 (1987); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980).
26. Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 (1986) ("If we find that [the
New York law penalizes persons who have exercised their right to migrate], appellees
must prevail unless New York can demonstrate that its classification is necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest."); see also Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 343 ("If there are
other, reasonable ways to achieve [a compelling state purpose] with a lesser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means.'" Id. (quoting Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960))).
27. The Supreme Court has "long held that if the basis of classification is inherently
suspect, such as race, the statute must be subjected to an exacting scrutiny, regardless of
the subject matter of the legislation." Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 621, 628 n.9 (1969).
28. See Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634.
29. See Gunther, supra note 13, at 8 (noting the Warren Court's aggressive "new"
equal protection, with scrutiny that was "strict" in theory and fatal in fact).
30. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
31. Id.
32. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).
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can be conceived that would sustain it. ''33 This test is weighted as

heavily in favor of the government as the strict scrutiny test is
34
weighted in favor of the individual.
Traditionally, the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests were the
only standards of review applied to classifications alleged to violate
equal protection. Because the two standards are so diametrically opposed, however,35 the Supreme Court has recognized an intermediate
level of review.36 This intermediate level applies to semi-suspect classifications and significant, though less than fundamental, interests. To
date, this level of review has included gender,37 illegitimacy,38 and
alienage.30 Intermediate level scrutiny requires that "[c]lassifications
.. .must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub40
stantially related to achievement of those objectives.1

Although the intermediate standard appears similar to the strict
scrutiny test, the marked difference between the two becomes apparent
when the significant words of each test are compared. Intermediate
scrutiny only requires an important governmental interest, whereas
strict scrutiny requires a compelling governmental interest. 41 Further,
the intermediate test only requires the state to show an interest is sub-

33. Id. at 528.
34. To prevail, the party attacking the statutory classification must establish that it
is wholly arbitrary and irrational. See Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486
U.S. 71, 83-84 (1988).
35. Strict scrutiny review, which requires the state to meet a heavy burden of proof,
is virtually outcome determinative in favor of the challenging party. Rational basis review, on the other hand, requires a nearly impossible showing by the challenging party,
and thus is virtually outcome determinative in the state's favor.
36. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41
(1985).
37. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
38. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
39. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (in upholding California law
requiring peace officers to be citizens, Court refused to acknowledge alienage as suspect
classification); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding state law limiting public teaching positions to citizens); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (New York law
limiting service in the state police to citizens upheld, impliedly rejecting alienage as suspect classification). The Supreme Court, however, has not consistently applied an intermediate level of review in alienage cases. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (illustrating the Court's vacillation between standards in alienage cases); see also Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (aliens are prime example of a "discrete and insular
minority" meriting heightened judicial scrutiny); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 215 (1944) (despite upholding executive action expelling persons of Japanese ancestry after Pearl Harbor, the Court declared any legal restriction on the civil rights of a
single racial group suspect).
40. Craig,429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).
41. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
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stantially related to the achievement of the governmental objective,
while strict scrutiny requires that the state prove the action is
necessary.4
Thus, there are clearly three distinct standards of review in equal
protection cases: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational
relation test. The Supreme Court's decisions in the field of equal protection, however, have applied these standards in myriad ways. Indeed,
Justice Marshall has characterized the Court's equal protection analysis as one employing a "spectrum of standards. 4 3 Despite this characterization, however, strict scrutiny review is the core of equal protection analysis, at least in the context of individual liberties. Accordingly,
Lyng v. InternationalUnion, UAW, 44 a case that may significantly restrict application of both the strict scrutiny standard and the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, warrants qualitative discussion.
II.

INTERNATIONAL UNIOlS IMPACT ON THOMPSON AND THE PENALTY
ANALYSIS OF EQUAL PROTECTION

Since Shapiro v. Thompson4 5 the United States Supreme Court
has applied a strict scrutiny analysis to determine the constitutionality
of any law that penalizes the exercise of a fundamental right.46 The
penalty analysis was first employed in Shapiro v. Thompson in 1969.
Thompson involved statutory provisions whereby Connecticut, Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia denied welfare assistance to applicants who had not resided in the jurisdictions for at least one year
immediately preceding their applications for welfare. 47 Vivian Thompson, an unwed mother of one child who was pregnant with a second,
moved from Massachusetts to Connecticut when her mother became
unable to support her. Because Ms. Thompson's pregnancy prevented
her from working, she applied for assistance under the program for Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).4s Thompson was denied
AFDC assistance, however, because she had not met Connecticut's oneyear residence requirement before her application was filed. 49 Thompson challenged the denial in a Connecticut federal district court, alleging that the one-year requirement was unconstitutional because of its

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
See supra note 18.
485 U.S. 360 (1988).
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
See infra text accompanying notes 113-52.
See Thompson, 394 U.S. at 622, 624, 626.
Id. at 623.
Id.
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chilling effect on the right to travel.50 Thompson prevailed in the
three-judge district court,5 1 and Shapiro, Connecticut's Commissioner
of Welfare, appealed to the United States Supreme Court.5 '
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the residence requirement was an unwarranted denial
of equal protection by the state of Connecticut.5 3 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, based the decision upon the fundamental
right of interstate travel.54 The Court noted that "[i]f a law has 'no
other purpose. . . than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by
penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional.' "85Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court held
that the interests advanced by the state of Connecticut5 6 were insufficient to justify the burden placed on indigents traveling into the
517
state.
The Court did not have to determine whether the interests of the
state of Connecticut were sufficient to justify the denial of welfare
under the AFDC program, since welfare is considered a governmental
gratuity, not a constitutional entitlement. 5 Although the government

5o. Id.
51. Under former sections 2281 and 2282 of title 28 of the United States Code, any
suit to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute on constitutional grounds was required
to be heard before a three-judge federal district court, with direct review in the United
States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282 (repealed 1976).
52. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 623.
53. Id. at 629.
54. Justice Brennan did not rely upon a specific constitutional provision to establish
the right of interstate migration. Rather, he noted:
"The constitutional right to travel from one State to another ... occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has
been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.
... [The] right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason,
it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the
beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created."
Id. at 630-31 (1969) (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)) (ellipses original).
55. Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)) (ellipsis
original).
56. The state of Connecticut asserted several justifications for the one-year residency requirement. Among the interests rejected by the Court were the state's desire to
protect the fiscal integrity of its welfare system, see id. at 627, the alleged need to discourage indigents who would enter the state solely to obtain larger benefits, see id. at
631, and the state's desire to distinguish between old and new residents on the basis of
their prior tax contributions. See id. at 632.
57. Id. at 638.
58. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (Court observed that state
regulation in social and economic fields, including programs such as Aid to Families with
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may not abridge the fundamental right to travel between states, the
government has no obligation to provide AFDC assistance.5 9
A. Entrenchment of the Penalty Analysis
Thompson significantly advanced the protection of individual liberties because it limited the government's ability to discriminate
against politically powerless minorities. Along with several other cases
in the late 1960s and early 1970s,10 Thompson expanded the applica-

bility of the strict scrutiny analysis by including within its scope state
laws that penalize the exercise of a fundamental right.
One case following Thompson, Dunn v. Blumstein,61 involved a
durational residence requirement similar to the one at issue in Thompson. The plaintiff, James Blumstein, moved in June of 1970 to Tennessee to teach law at Vanderbilt University in Nashville. Intending to
vote in Tennessee's August and November elections, Blumstein tried
to register as a voter in July of 1970.2 The county registrar refused to
register Blumstein because Tennessee law prohibited the registration
of any voter who would not have been a resident for one year by the
time of the next election.6 3 Blumstein challenged the law as a violation
of equal protection, and the United States Supreme Court sustained
his objection, stating, "Obviously, durational residence laws single out
the class of bona fide state and county residents who have recently
exercised this constitutionally protected right [to travel], and penalize
such travelers directly. ' 6 4 The Court, finding that the right to vote was
fundamental, -relied on its holding in Thompson to strike down the
Tennessee law.6 5 The Court held that "'any classification which serves
to penalize the exercise of [a constitutionally protected] right, unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest,

Dependent Children, does not affect freedom guaranteed by the Bill of Rights); see also
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1010 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissent characterizing Dandridge as implicitly rejecting the
idea that a fundamental right to welfare exists); Bork, The Impossibility of Finding
Welfare Rights in the Constitution,1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695 (discussing practical and theoretical impediments to the judicial creation of a constitutional right to welfare).
59. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
60. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (travel and voting); Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (voting); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967) (marriage).
61. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
62. Id. at 331.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 338.
65. Id. at 338-40.
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is unconstitutional.' """ Furthermore, the Court established that deterrence was not required by Thompson: a penalty alone, applied to a
7
person because of the exercise of a fundamental right, was sufficient.1
Thus, Blumstein firmly established Thompson's penalty analysis as a
protection against one form of governmental restriction on the exercise
of fundamental rights.6 "
B. Lyng v. International Union, UAW: No Impermissible Burden
In International Union the Court applied the penalty analysis,
but reached a result difficult to reconcile with Thompson and Blumstein.6 9 In InternationalUnion striking union members challenged the
constitutionality of a 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act that
precludes households from becoming eligible for food stamps or having
their allotment increased if a member of the household participates in
a strike.70 The federal statute grants benefits to persons not working
for any reason other than striking; thus, any worker could quit his job,

for example, and still be eligible for food stamps."
Two unions and several individual union members brought suit

66. Id. at 339 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)) (emphasis
added).
67. Id. at 339-40. The Court stated:
It is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement or denial of welfare is a more potent deterrent to travel. [Thompson] did not rest upon a finding that denial of
welfare actually deterred travel ....

In [Thompson] we explicitly stated that

the compelling state interest test would be triggered by "any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right [to travel] .... .
Id. (quoting Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634). But see infra text accompanying notes 101-11.
68. See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (Court again
relied on Thompson to strike down durational residence requirement for medicare). But
see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (Court upheld durational residence requirement
for divorce, but avoided use of strict scrutiny language).
69. See Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 363-64 (1988).
70. The challenged amendment provides in part:
[A] household shall not participate in the food stamp program at any time that
any member of such household, not exempt from the work registration requirements ...

is on strike ...

because of a-labor dispute (other than a lockout)

. : Provided, That a household shall not lose its eligibility to participate in
the food stamp program as a result of one of its members going on strike if the
household was eligible for food stamps immediately prior to such strike, however, such household shall not receive an increased allotment as the result of a
decrease in the income of the striking member or members of the household
7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (1988) (emphasis in original).
71. See InternationalUnion, 485 U.S. at 372 n.9 ("[O]ne who voluntarily quits a job
is disqualified for food stamps for 90 days. Thereafter, he is eligible as long as he registers for work and cannot find a job.").
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against the Secretary of Agriculture, asserting that the amendment penalized union members' fundamental right to associate with their families, their unions, and their fellow union members.7 2 The plaintiffs also
contended that the amendment to the Food Stamp Act interfered with
their first amendment right to "express themselves about union matters free of coercion by the Government."73 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the new law violated the equal protection component of the
74
due process clause of the fifth amendment.
5
In a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the amendment.76 Consequently, if InternationalUnion is factually
analogous to Thompson, then the Court has modified Thompson-and
with it the important penalty analysis requiring strict scrutiny. In order to determine Thompson's future viability, closer comparison of
Thompson and InternationalUnion is necessary. When comparing the
two cases, one must keep in mind the distinction between policy objectives and constitutional requirements. Although the effect of the statute in InternationalUnion may be desirable from a policy standpoint,
since the workers voluntarily chose to become unemployed, the Court's
role is to evaluate the statute's constitutionality, not its political desir7
ability, which is the province of the legislature.
The two cases are easy to compare. In each case a fundamental
right was implicated: Thompson involved the right to travel; International Union involved the right to associate. Further, the plaintiffs in
both cases were eligible for a statutory benefit 8 but for their respective
decisions to exercise a constitutional right. Here the similarities end,
however, for in Thompson the Supreme Court protected the exercise of
the right,7 but in International Union the Court denied protection."s

72. See id. at 363. In InternationalUnion, as in Thompson, the parties were denied
benefits as a result of their exercise of a fundamental right. In Thompson, Vivian
Thompson would have been eligible for benefits if she had been a resident of Connecti-

cut for one year prior to her application, but her recent change of residence kept her
from receiving them. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 623 (1969).
73. InternationalUnion, 485 U.S. at 364.
74. Id. (violation of equal protection component of fifth amendment due process
clause argued before the district court).
75. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the case.
76. Id. at 374.
77. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) ("It is not the mission of this
Court or any other to decide whether the balance of competing interests reflected in
[duly enacted statutes] is wise social policy.").
78. The statutory benefits in Thompson and InternationalUnion were food stamps
(policy-based entitlements distributed under a revocable legislative decree, not by constitutional mandate) and did not involve constitutional rights. See International Union,
485 U.S. at 362; Thompson, 394 U.S. at 622-23.
79. See Thompson, 394 U.S. at 642.
80. See International Union, 485 U.S. at 374.
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Accordingly, the inconsistent result must be explained by the importance of the fundamental right involved, the construction of the statutes, the importance of the state interest, or the manner in which the
right was affected.
The relative importance of the rights involved does not explain the
apparently inconsistent result. The Thompson Court declared the right
of travel to be fundamental to our federal system,"' and the Court in
International Union granted the same status to the right of association."2 It would be illogical to assume that of two fundamental concepts, one is more important than the other. Therefore, International
Union cannot be justified by reference to the significance of the interest at stake.
Statutory construction and importance of state interests also fail
as bases on which to distinguish the cases. In Thompson the Court
applied the strict scrutiny test and held that the law was not tailored
narrowly enough to prevent fraud.8 3 The International Union Court
applied the more lenient rational relation standard and upheld the
law.8" The Thompson Court used a strict scrutiny analysis because the
state legislation penalized the fundamental right at issue.8 5 In International Union the Court applied the more deferential standard because
it found no substantial impact on the exercise of the fundamental right
in issue.88 The Court's use of different standards prevents meaningful
comparison of statutory construction or the relative importance of
state interests because these two areas are evaluated differently, depending upon which standard applies.8 7 The key to distinguishing
Thompson from InternationalUnion, therefore, lies in understanding
how the Court classifies burdens on fundamental rights.
C. The Supreme Court's Classifications of Burdens on
Fundamental Rights
Analysis of Supreme Court decisions reveals that a fundamental

81. See Thompson, 394 U.S. at 629-31.
82. The Court in InternationalUnion clarified the importance of the right of association by noting that" 'one of the foundations of our society is the right of individuals to
combine with other persons in pursuit of a common goal by lawful means ....
' International Union, 485 U.S. at 366 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 933 (1982)).
83. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 637.

84. See International Union, 485 U.S. at 362-69.
85. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 638.

86. International Union, 485 U.S. at 362-69.
87. See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection stan-

dards of review).
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right may be burdened in one of three ways. First, the right can be
restricted by proscription, imposed before and completely preventing
exercise of the right.8 8 Through proscription, the state places an obstacle in the path of a person seeking to exercise the right. Second, the
restriction can be in the form of a sanction, or penalty, imposed only
after the right has been exercised."' Since by definition this type of
restriction is only imposed after exercise of the right, it can never be an
obstacle to an individual seeking to exercise the right. Third, the restriction can be imposed by refusing to facilitate the exercise of a
right.90 Under the third type of restriction, the exercise of the right
may be deterred, but it is not penalized. Examples of the three forms
of state restriction help to classify the restriction in International
Union.
In Roe v. Wade 91 the state of Texas prohibited women from terminating pregnancies by abortion unless abortion was necessary to save
the mother's life. Since the law made the very exercise of the right
unlawful, the right was theoretically not available. In Thompson a penalty was imposed upon the right to travel. The state of Connecticut
refused to provide governmental assistance to applicants who had exercised their right to travel within the previous twelve months.92 The
sanction came only after the right was exercised, and removing it
would not have made exercise of the right any more accessible, since
the sanction was not an obstacle to travel. Regardless of whether the
sanction made travel unattractive, it did not make travel unavailable.
In other cases, the Supreme Court has reviewed decisions by states
to refuse to facilitate certain rights. Since Roe v. Wade courts have
recognized a woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy
by abortion. In Harris v. McRae93 and Maher v. Roe, 94 however, the
Supreme Court considered whether a state could refuse to pay for the
abortion once a woman had chosen to exercise that right. The Maher
Court stated:
[T]he right [protecting a] woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy

88. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (state statute prohibited marriage by certain class of persons).
89. See, e.g., Thompson, 394 U.S. at 622 n.2 (benefits denied persons moving into
state).
90. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (indigent childbirth funded,
but not indigent abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466 n.2 (1977) (same).

91. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), limited by Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S.
Ct. 3040 (1989).

92. See Thompson, 394 U.S. at 622-23.
93. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
94. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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I . . implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds."5
The appellees in Maher argued that Connecticut was obligated to
"accord equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and [could]
not evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical expenses
incident to childbirth."9' The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, stat97
ing that Wade did not create a constitutional right to an abortion.
Based on these representative cases, it is clear that states may not
unduly interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right by proscription (prior restriction) 98 or penalty (subsequent restriction),9 9 but they
may refuse to facilitate the exercise of the right by refusing to fund
protected activities.100 Had the International Union Court characterized the state action as a penalty, the denial of food stamps would not
have been upheld under a Thompson analysis, assuming the federal
government could not have demonstrated a compelling interest necessarily served. Thus, in order to uphold the challenged statute, the International Union Court either must have regarded the denial of food
stamps in InternationalUnion as a refusal to fund rather than a penalty or proscription or it must have implicitly modified Thompson.
D.

The Effect of International Union: Deterrence Requirement
Added to Penalty Analysis

In International Union, just as in Thompson, the Supreme
Court's equal protection analysis focused on whether the exercise of a
fundamental right had been burdened. In International Union, however, the Court's definition of "burden" assumed a new requirement:
the exercise of the right must actually be deterred. Thus, the critical
difference between Thompson and International Union involves the
concept of deterrence.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Thompson majority, applied strict
scrutiny without mention of any requirement of deterrence to laws that
allegedly penalized the exercise of a fundamental right." 1 There was
no evidence in Thompson that the challenged laws actually deterred

95. Id. at 473-74.
96. Id. at 470.
97. Id. at 473.
98. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), limited by Webster v. Reproductive
Health Serve., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
99. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969).
100. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (1977).
101. See Thompsbn, 394 U.S. at 631-32.
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interstate migration, yet the Court declared the laws unconstitutional
simply because they penalized travelers for exercising a fundamental
right.10 2 Thus, actual deterrence of the right in question was not required by the majority in Thompson. Likewise, in Dunn v. Blumstein "°3 the Court did not require that the right of travel be deterred in
order to find the challenged law unconstitutional. 04 In fact, the Blumstein Court stated explicitly that deterrence was not necessary to invoke the compelling state interest test:
Tennessee seeks to avoid the clear command of [Thompson] by arguing that durational residence requirements for voting neither seek to
nor actually do deter [interstate] travel. In essence, Tennessee argues
that the right to travel is not abridged here in any constitutionally
relevant sense.
This view represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law.
It is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement or denial of welfare is the
more potent deterrent to travel. [Thompson] did not
rest upon a find10 5
ing that denial of welfare actually deterred travel.
Nonetheless, in International Union Justice White implicitly rejected the theory of Blumstein, refusing to apply strict scrutiny because there was no evidence that the right of association had been de07
terred. 10 8 Relying on a case factually similar to InternationalUnion,'
Justice White altered the standard of review for laws allegedly penalizing the exercise of a fundamental right. 08 Accordingly, after International Union, plaintiffs attacking state statutes as violative of equal
protection must show not only that the statute penalizes the exercise
of a fundamental right, but also that the statute actually deters per-

102. See id.
103. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
104. Id. at 339-40.
105. Id. at 339 (footnotes omitted).
106. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 366 (1988) ("[lIt seems 'exceedingly unlikely' that this statute will prevent individuals from continuing to associate together in
unions to promote their lawful objectives.").
107. Justice White relied on Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986). In Castillo, just
as in International Union, a law was challenged by family members alleging unequal
treatment in the distribution of food stamps. See id. at 637.
108. See International Union, 485 U.S. at 365 (citing Castillo, 477 U.S. at 638).
While the deterrence requirement so critical in InternationalUnion also was present in
the earlier case, Castillo, International Union is more appropriate for study because it
involved a wider range of fundamental rights. Since International Union involved the
right to associate with family members and with the union, whereas Castillo only involved the right to associate with family members, International Union involved the
first amendment right to free expression and thus provides a more comprehensive look at
the Court's treatment of burdens on fundamental rights.
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sons from exercising that right.' The standard of review after International Union thus became more stringent, since a law may now penalize the exercise of a fundamental right so long as it stops short of
deterring its exercise. 110
The Supreme Court's opinion in International Union implies that
a penalty is constitutional unless it rises to the level of a deterrent.
After International Union, therefore, the threshold question is not
whether the penalty is constitutional, but whether the effect of the
penalty is so great as to make the penalty unconstitutional."',

IV.

EVOLUTION OF THE PENALTY ANALYSIs FOLLOWING
SHAPiRO V. THOMPSON

InternationalUnion thus far has been construed as a direct attack
on Thompson. Careful review of the cases after Thompson, however,
reveals that such construction may be inaccurate. Instead, International Union may be understood better as the culmination of a subtle
erosion which, over time, has limited Thompson's precedential value." 2
In evaluating this view, the evolution of post-Thompson cases and the
politics of the Court must be analyzed.
In Shapiro v. Thompson the Supreme Court made clear that any
state-imposed penalty on the exercise of a fundamental right would be
subjected to strict scrutiny. The Court was resolute in its adherence to
Thompson for at least five years, 113 but in Maher v. Roe" 4 the Court
narrowed the definition of penalty and thus avoided having to apply

109. See id. at 365-66.
110. See id. The following hypothetical helps illustrate this point. Consider a professional football player who spikes the ball after he scores a touchdown. If his team withholds part of his salary each time he spikes the ball, he is penalized for his action. Nevertheless he may continue to spike the ball and incur the penalty if the amount of salary
withheld is relatively small. In such a case he would be penalized, but not deterred. Were
the team to withhold his entire paycheck every week that he spiked the ball, however, he
probably could not afford to continue the objectionable behavior and would stop spiking
the ball. Thus, not only would the player have been penalized, but also deterred. Although the only difference between the deterring and the nondeterring action is the
amount of the penalty, the two situations are distinguishable under the International
Union test.
111. This "penalty plus deterrent" approach has been decried by at least one constitutional scholar. See L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 16-8 n.18, at 1457 (declaring odd any
"'fundamental right' whose exercise government could penalize just a bit without any
special justification").
112. For an explanation of the Court's evolution since Thompson, see infra text accompanying notes 113-52.
113. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); see also infra
text accompanying notes 116-23.
114. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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strict scrutiny. Although the Court avoided finding a penalty in many
later cases, it never refused to apply strict scrutiny when a penalty was
found to exist. In International Union, however, the Court implicitly
modified Thompson by refusing to apply strict scrutiny where the penalty had not deterred the individual from exercising the fundamental
right in question.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Thompson, stated
that a law is unconstitutional if it has "no other purpose . . than to
chill the assertion of constitutional rights."'1 5 Justice Brennan has consistently adhered to this standard, and his opinion in Thompson provides a reference point from which the Court's departure may be fully
appreciated.
The dissenters in Thompson, Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black
and Justice Harlan, had left the Court by the end of the 1971 term.
Consequently, InternationalUnion cannot represent the eventual triumph of the Thompson minority. Replacing the Thompson dissenters
were Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell. In
1972 the new members of the Court were presented with their first
durational residence case in Dunn v. Blumstein."6 Justice Marshall,
who had aligned with Justice Brennan three years earlier, wrote the
majority opinion in which he stated that "[Thompson] and the compelling-state-interest test it articulates control this case." 7 By relying
on the Thompson penalty analysis to invalidate the residence requirement that penalized the right of travel in Blumstein, the Court reaffirmed Thompson. Chief Justice Burger, who contributed to the gradual erosion of Thompson in subsequent years, filed a dissenting
opinion." 8 Justices Rehnquist and Powell took no part in the decision.
In 1974 the Court decided yet another durational residence requirement case. In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County" 9 a local
government conditioned the receipt of nonemergency hospitalization or
medical care by indigents upon one year's residence in the county. Justice Marshall's opinion for the majority struck down the statute, again
relying upon Thompson. 120 Of the three justices who replaced the
Thompson minority, only Rehnquist dissented in Maricopa County.' 2'

115. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969).
116. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
117. Id. at 339.
118. See id. at 363 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
119. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
120. Justice Marshall noted: "[A]ppellants urge that [Thompson] is controlling. We
agree ... that Arizona's durational residence requirement for free medical care must be
justified by a compelling state interest and that, such interests being lacking, the requirement is unconstitutional." Id. at 254.
121. See id. at 277 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Justice Powell joined the majority opinion, and Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the result. 122 Thus, after Maricopa County the opposition
to Thompson seemed to have fragmented, leaving Thompson a fixed
123
point on the constitutional landscape.
In Maher v. Roe,'124 however, the Court severely limited Thompson, allowing Connecticut to deny funding for elective abortions on the
theory that the state had no obligation to fund the exercise of fundamental rights. 125 Justice Powell, a member of the majority supporting
Thompson in Maricopa County, wrote for the majority in Maher and
remarked that the "[a]ppellees' reliance on the penalty analysis of
[Thompson] and Maricopa County [was] misplaced.' '

26

Justice Powell

limited Thompson by carving out a major exception to permit states to
refuse to fund fundamental rights. 2" Joining Justice Powell in the
Maher majority were Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
along with "swing votes" Justices Stewart and White of the Thompson
majority.
The Maher minority, which had led the majority in the three previous cases, could not prevent Justice Powell from framing the issue in
a way that avoided application of strict scrutiny as required by
Thompson. Apparently, Justice Powell's strategy was to weaken
Thompson without overruling it, so the swing votes on the Court could
be convinced to vote against Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
The Court's next encounter with Thompson came in Zablocki v.
Redhail.12' The challenged statute in Zablocki prevented, instead of
penalizing, the marriage of a certain class of persons 29 and was therefore a simple case to decide. The Court reiterated that "[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently
important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests." 130 The fact that Zablocki was not decided on the basis of

122. See id. at 270.
123. But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (Court's opinion upholding durational residence requirement for divorce avoided all language of strict scrutiny).
124. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
125. See id. at 474 n.8.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
129. Id. at 375.
130. Id. at 388 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977);
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262-63 (1974); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144
(1972)).

The Court did ndt mention Thompson, thus implicitly viewing the state action as a
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Thompson does not justify its exclusion from this analysis, since
Zablocki eventually proved to be the talisman needed to circumvent
131
Thompson.
In 1980 the Court resumed the penalty discussion with Harris v.
McRae,"' another abortion funding case. The Court in McRae upheld
the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. Not surprisingly, the
Court reinforced Maher in a decision notable mainly for the addition
of Justice Stevens to the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun minority. 133 The
majority was comprised of the five justices from the Maher majority.
The Hyde Amendment was similar to the statute in Maher, except
that the Hyde Amendment further restricted benefits. While Maher
held that a state could withhold funding for nontherapeutic abortions,
McRae upheld a statute that permitted the state to withhold funding
4
even when abortion was medically necessary.1
The appellee in McRae contended that "the Hyde Amendment affects a significant interest not present or asserted in Maher-the interest of the woman in protecting her health during pregnancy. .... ,,.35
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, replied:
[R]egardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery
of the due process liberty recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional
entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range
of protected choices. The reason why was explained in Maher: although government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's
exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its
own creation.13 6
In a later note, the Court observed: "The appellees argue that the
Hyde Amendment is unconstitutional because it 'penalizes' the exercise of a woman's choice to terminate a pregnancy by abortion. This
argument falls short of the mark."'7 Thus, the Court reviewed the
penalty argument and allowed more governmental interference with
the right in issue, but avoided expressly offending Thompson by char-

classification violating equal protection, not a penalty on the exercise of a right.
131. The InternationalUnion Court relied on Zablocki's less exacting standard, not
on Thompson, to deal with the burden on union workers' rights, even though Thompson

factually was more analogous. For further explanation of the International Union
Court's use of Zablocki, see infra text accompanying notes 139-44.
132. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
133. See id. at 349 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

134.
135.
136.
137.

See id. at 326.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 317 n.19 (citations omitted).
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acterizing the infringement as a nonpenalty. 13 With McRae, the antiThompson majority approved of all but the most restrictive state actions-those that actually preclude the exercise of a fundamental right.
The Court in InternationalUnion implicitly followed McRae and
made no reference to Thompson. The reason for the omission is unclear; a comparison to Thompson hardly would have been inapposite. 139 Justice White instead relied on Zablocki for the standard of re-

view.140 Regardless of the result it produced, Justice White's reliance
on Zablocki may have been misplaced.
As previously noted, the Supreme Court has recognized three
types of burdens on the exercise of fundamental rights1 4 and has developed three different constitutional standards, one for each type of
burden. In Zablocki the State of Wisconsin prohibited certain classes
of people from marrying.1 42 The Court's analysis in Zablocki therefore
applies to prior restraints. In Thompson the Court set out the standard
for subsequent burdens, or penalties, on the exercise of fundamental
rights, and in Maher the Court provided the standard for analyzing a
state's refusal to fund the exercise of a fundamental right. In International Union Justice White characterized the effect of the 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act not as a prior restraint, but as a refusal to
fund, noting that the government has no obligation to pay for the exercise of a fundamental right. 4 3 Assuming Justice White properly char-

138. See id.
139. The majority opinion in International Union failed to mention Thompson,
which was argued by the union (appellee) but not by the Secretary of Agriculture. See
Brief of Appellee at 19, 41, 42. Surprisingly, however, the case relied on by Justice White
for the standard of review, Zablocki, was not argued in the briefs of either the union or
the Secretary. Instead, the only mention of Zablocki came from an amicus curiae brief
submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation in support of the union
appellees. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 22. It is ironic that the case ultimately used to
support the decision against the union was argued only by amicus curiae on the union's
behalf.
140. See Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 364 (1988). Justice White
stated:
We deal first with the District Court's holding that § 109 violates the associational and expressive rights of appellees under the First Amendment. These
claimed constitutional infringements are also pressed as a basis for finding that
appellees' rights of "fundamental importance" have been burdened, thus requiring this Court to examine appellees' equal protection claims under a
heightened standard of review. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
Since we conclude that the statute does not infringe either the associational or
expressive rights of appellees, we must reject both parts of this analysis.
Id. at 364 (parallel citations omitted).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 88-100.
142. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.
143. International Union, 485 U.S. at 368.
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acterized the effect of the amendment, the analysis of Maher, not
Zablocki, should have been applied in International Union.
Despite Justice White's characterization of the amendment as a
prior restraint, the amendment clearly imposed a burden after the
workers went on strike, thus making the burden a penalty. The amendment did not prohibit a worker from striking, so it was not a prior
restraint and should not have been analyzed under Zablocki. Likewise,
the amendment did not refuse to pay for a worker's costs of striking,144
so it should not have been analyzed according to Maher. Because it
imposed a burden upon a worker who had already exercised his right
to strike, the amendment should have been analyzed as a penalty
under Thompson. Justice White's opinion illustrates that in 1988, despite the addition of several new justices, the Thompson analysis still
dictated a standard of review unappealing to a majority of the Supreme Court.
Once the majority determined the statute did not warrant strict
scrutiny, upholding it required no more than rote application of the
rational relation test. 4 5 The dissent, however, authored by Justice
Marshall and joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, would have
invalidated the statute even under the rational relation test."4 Logi-

144. At least there was no refusal in the sense of Maher and McRae, in which the
benefits were needed by the applicant before exercise of the right, in order to make the
right available. In International Union the right to strike was available, and the union
members exercised that right. The union members did not apply for benefits before
striking, and did not require the benefits in order to be able to strike.
145. See id. at 372-73.
146. See id. at 374 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated, "After canvassing the many absurdities that afflict the striker amendment, I conclude that it fails
to pass constitutional muster under even the most deferential scrutiny." Id. Justice Marshall's dissent gave more attention to the arguments proffered by Secretary of Agriculture Lyng in support of the striker amendment than did the majority opinion. After
analyzing the statistics presented by the Secretary, Marshall concluded that the amendment was not rationally related to the objective of reducing federal expenditures, because relatively few strikers resort to food stamps during a labor dispute. Id. at 377
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority opinion did not analyze any such statistics, noting only that "the discretion about how best to spend money to improve the general
welfare is lodged in Congress rather than the courts." Id. at 373.
Likewise, even though the majority concluded the amendment was rationally related
to the legitimate objective of promoting governmental neutrality in labor disputes, see
id. at 371, Justice Marshall rejected this conclusion, criticizing the majority's reliance on
Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977). In Hodory, the unemployment compensation received by strikers was funded in part by employer contributions. Justice Marshall thus found the majority's application of Hodory to the facts of
InternationalUnion unwarranted. Accordingly, while the rational relation standard can
be met in most instances, Justice Marshall effectively pointed out the cursory analysis by
the majority and created a legitimate doubt as to whether the striker amendment at
issue in InternationalUnion should have passed constitutional muster so easily.
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cally, the147dissent also doubted that the statute would survive strict
scrutiny.

The InternationalUnion Court, by requiring a penalty and deterrence when only a penalty was required before, narrowed the scope of
Thompson's application to cases in which the exercise of fundamental
rights is deterred. According to the Court's logic, applying strict scrutiny when a fundamental right is penalized so slightly that the actor is
not even deterred is unnecessary to protect fundamental rights under
the Constitution. 148 Despite the Court's appealing logic, however, the
effect of InternationalUnion is to withhold strict scrutiny review from
all but the most compelling cases. The Court realistically could not
have limited Thompson any further than it did in International
Union. Failure to follow Thompson when a fundamental right actually
is deterred would call into question the very existence of fundamental
rights in our society.
The practical effect of International Union is to require individuals to forego the exercise of their fundamental rights in order that they
might show deterrence. In order for a union member to prevail under
the International Union standard, the union member would have to
refuse to strike in order to provide evidence that the denial of food
stamps deterred the exercise of the right. Such a requirement is inherently unfair to the worker, who is in a no-win situation. If the worker
strikes, he can be penalized by being denied food stamps for as long as
he continues to strike. Conversely, if the worker chooses not to strike
he will not receive food stamps and will be forced to endure the condi149
tions which motivated his desire to strike.

147. See id. at 375 n.1. (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Because I conclude that the
striker amendment fails the deferential rational basis test, I see no need to address

whether stricter scrutiny should apply to protect the First Amendment interests asserted
by appellees, although I am unconvinced by the Court's treatment of that issue as

well.").
148. But see supra note 111 (penalty itself is objectionable, without regard to its
magnitude or effect).
149. The reality of this no-win scenario is borne out by the Court's own reasoning in
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986), which involved an alleged penalty on the right of

association. The Castillo Court held that the definition of "household" under the Food
Stamp Act, which limited the ability of extended families living together to receive more
than one allotment of food stamps, did not penalize the family members' right of association, since it did not deter the family members from dining together. Id. at 636. Based
on this lack of deterrence, no unconstitutional penalty was found to exist. The Castillo
Court, however, noted later in its opinion that "[i]t is exceedingly unlikely that close

relatives would choose to live apart simply to increase their allotment of food stamps, for
the costs of separate housing would almost certainly exceed the incremental value of the
additional stamps." Id. at 638. Thus, the Castillo Court required deterrence even when it
acknowledged that deterrence probably would never be established because of practical

considerations.
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V.

INTERNATIONAL UNIOiN's IMPACT ON THE DOCTRINE OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS

The equal protection clause governs, among other things, the ability of a state to withhold benefits from an individual, who is otherwise
entitled to those benefits, simply because that individual intends to exercise, or has already exercised, a fundamental right in a way the state
does not favor. The equal protection clause does not purport to govern
a state's ability to "bargain" with an individual in an effort to condition the receipt of a desired benefit upon forfeiture of a fundamental
right. When the state seeks to impose such a condition upon the receipt of a benefit, the propriety of the state's action must be determined according to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
"Conditioning the extension of a governmental benefit or 'privilege' upon the surrender of constitutional rights has long appealed to
Congress and the state legislatures as a means of regulating private
conduct."1 50 Such lawmaking theoretically violates the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. In a recent article, Professor Richard Epstein
outlined the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 51 The doctrine,
wrote Epstein, "holds that even if a state has absolute discretion to
grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly 'coerce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the
waiver of constitutional rights." 152

53
The doctrine is implicated in several different factual scenarios.1

150. Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1595, 1595 (1960) (footnote omitted). The author explains the rationale behind this phenomenon as follows:

This appeal is principally attributable to the superficially compelling logic of
the arguments upon which the validity of such conditions is supposed to rest.
It is contended that if the government may withhold the benefit in the first
instance, without giving a reason, it may withhold or revoke the benefit even
though its reason for doing so may be the individual's refusal to surrender his
constitutional rights. This argument is often phrased in syllogistic terms: if the
legislature may withhold a particular benefit, it may grant it in a limited form
since the greater power of withholding absolutely must necessarily include the
lesser power of granting with restrictions. As a corollary to this argument, the
contention is made that the recipient of the benefit is not deprived of a right
since he may retain it simply by rejecting the proffered benefit.
Id. at 1595-96 (footnotes omitted).
151. See Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4, 6-7 (1988).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 7. Epstein noted:
[I]n the context of individual rights, the doctrine provides that on at least
some occasions receipt of a benefit to which someone has no constitutional entitlement does not justify making that person abandon some right guaranteed
under the Constitution. In other instances, the doctrine prevents the govern-
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"The problem of unconstitutional conditions arises whenever a government seeks to achieve its desired result by obtaining bargained-for consent of the party whose conduct is to be restricted.115 4 When imposing
an unconstitutional condition, the government effectively bargains with
an individual, obtaining the individual's promise to exercise a right in a
certain way in exchange for a benefit that corresponds to that right.
When imposing a penalty, on the other hand, the government says
nothing until after a particular right has been exercised, at which time
it withholds a benefit as the result of the exercise of the right.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions often closely resembles equal protection, 5 5 but Professor Epstein's hypotheticals are especially helpful in understanding the distinction between the two. For
example, he suggests a scenario in which a corporation desires to locate
in a particular state that is averse to the corporation's business, but is
unwilling to prohibit its entry. If the state allows the corporation to
locate in the state but then denies the new corporation benefits that
are available to other corporations located there, the state has penalized the exercise of the corporation's right to interstate migration and
thereby denied the corporation equal protection of the law. 58 The
state, however, has not obtained consent of the corporation for the denial of benefits, so the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not
apply.
Thus, as Professor Epstein states, "although a state may absolutely forbid foreign corporations from doing business within its borders, it cannot allow them in on condition that they waive their right
to federal diversity jurisdiction, any more than it could divest them of
this right by statute. ' 157 This would amount to asking the corporation
to surrender rights the state could not take directly. Likewise, requesting the corporation to submit to terms more onerous than those demanded of other corporations is an unconstitutional condition. Thus,
the state which "may prevent foreign corporations from doing business
in the state altogether. . . may not allow them to do business only on

ment from asking the individual to surrender by agreement rights that the government could not take by direct action .... In still other instances, the doctrine closely resembles equal protection, barring the state from making certain
privileges available to individuals only if they consent to terms more onerous
than those demanded when the same privileges are made available to others.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
154. Id.
155. See supra note 153.
156. This hypothetical assumes, arguendo, that a corporation has a right to interstate migration.
157. Epstein, supra note 151, at 7 (footnote omitted).
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condition that they pay higher taxes than their local competitors." 158
Accordingly, the essential difference between the two doctrines is
that an unconstitutional 'condition, unlike an equal protection violation, requires the state to exact a promise from the individual that the
individual will forego some right or will exercise a right in a certain
way. 1 9 Although International Union did not involve a promise or
bargain between the federal government and the union workers, the
case may have a significant impact upon the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
A.

Development of the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions

The Supreme Court first embraced the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions in 1926 in Frost v. Railroad Commission.'" The Frost Court
held that as a general rule, a state having the constitutional authority
to deny a privilege outright may grant the privilege subject to whatever
conditions it chooses to impose."' "But the power of the state in that
respect is not unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not
impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional
rights." 62' The California statute challenged in Frost allowed a private
freight carrier to travel upon the state's highways only if he dedicated
his equipment to the business of public transportation and subjected
himself to the legal restrictions and duties applicable to common carriers.' 63 The Court struck down the statute as an unconstitutional condition, noting that "[i]f the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner,
compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded
in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out
1 64
of existence."
Later the same year, the Court applied the doctrine of unconstitu16 5
tional conditions in Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Carr.
Hanover
involved Professor Epstein's paradigm corporation scenario. The Court
held that "the state may not exact as a condition of the corporation's
engaging in business within its limits that its rights secured to it by the
Constitution of the United States may be infringed."' 66

158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

271 U.S. 583 (1926).
Id. at 593.
Id. at 593-94.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 594.
272 U.S. 494 (1926).
Id. at 507.
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With the exception of Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v.
Read, 67 subsequent cases involving conditions on corporate activity in
the state have followed the Hanover rule.16 In Lincoln National the
Court "seemed to adopt precisely the argument that was rejected in
Hanover Fire Insurance Co.: 'that a State may discriminate against
foreign corporations by admitting them under more onerous conditions
than it exacts from domestic companies ..

."169 Lincoln National,
'.

however, proved to be an aberration which the Court refused to follow.
Instead, the Court in subsequent decisions returned to the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions170
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions also has been considered in the context of the first amendment cases.' 7' In Speiser v. RandalI1 7 ' the Court struck down a California law requiring applicants for
a veterans' property-tax exemption to sign an oath that they did not
advocate the unlawful overthrow of the government of the state of California or of the United States.1 73 Although Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion, did not expressly mention Frost,he used
the doctrine to complete the Court's analysis.174 The Court concluded
that "when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by
a State's general taxing program due process demands that the speech
be unencumbered until the State comes forward with sufficient proof
to justify its inhibition.117 Because California could not justify its inhibition on speech, the Court concluded that the procedure requiring
the oath against anti-government speech as a condition for the receipt
76
of a tax exemption was unconstitutional.1
In fact, the most recent Supreme Court cases on unconstitutional
conditions have focused primarily on first amendment rights, 77 relying

167. 325 U.S. 673 (1945).
168. See, e.g., Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648,
664-67 (1981).
169. Id. at 665 (quoting Lincoln Nat'l, 325 U.S. at 677).
170. See, e.g., id. at 667 (noting that, based upon the Court's decisions "before and
after Lincoln National, it is difficult to view that decision as other than an anachronism"); WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968) (corporations admitted to do business in state must be treated as domestic corporations, at least with regard
to property taxes); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (state's power to
license or exclude out-of-state corporations is limited by Constitution).
171. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
172. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
173. Id. at 529.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 528-29.
176. Id. at 529.
177. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Hobbie v. Unemployment Ap-
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upon the guidelines set forth in Sherbert v. Verner. 78 In Sherbert "a
member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was discharged by her
South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the
Sabbath Day of her faith.'

7

After trying unsuccessfully to obtain

other employment, she filed for unemployment compensation benefits
according to state law.1 s0 Her application was denied by the Employment Security Commission in administrative proceedings'8 s provided
for by the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act. 18 2 The

Commission decision was affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme
Court, but was overturned by the United States Supreme Court.'8 3 The
Court's decision again was announced by Justice Brennan, who six
years later authored Thompson. He wrote:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
184
against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Furthermore, Justice Brennan stated, "It is too late in the day to
doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by

peals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); see also Fuhr, The
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and the First Amendment, 39 CASE W. RES.
97, 98 n.6 (1988-89) (noting recent federal court cases in which the doctrine has been
employed). In his article, Fuhr suggests that the increased number of conditions on government benefits limiting first and fourth amendment rights have led a number of courts
in addition to the Supreme Court to renew their interest in the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See id.
178. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
179. Id. at 399 (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted:
Appellant became a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in 1957, at
a time when her employer, a textile-mill operator, permitted her to work a fiveday week. It was not until 1959 that the work week was changed to six days,
including Saturday, for all three shifts in the employer's mill.
Id. at 399 n.1.
180. Id. at 399-400.
181. See id. at 401.
182. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-27-10 to -41-50 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (formerly S.C. CODE OF
LAWS §§ 68-1 to -404 (1962)). The Act provides that a claimant, in order to be eligible for
benefits, must be "able to work and . . . available for work .... " Id. § 41-35-110(3).
The Act also provides that a claimant is not eligible "[i]f... he has failed, without good
cause ... to accept available suitable work when offered to him by the employment office
or an employer ..

."

Id. § 41-35-120(3)(a)(ii).

183. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
184. Id. at 404.
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the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."'""
In 1981 the Supreme Court reaffirmed Sherbert in Thomas v. Review Board of IndianaEmployment Security Division.'8" The Thomas
Court held that the state's denial of benefits to an individual who quit
his job because his religious beliefs forbade participation in the manufacture of armaments187violated the employee's first amendment right to
exercise his religion.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was once again affirmed in a 1987 case involving facts almost identical to those of Sherbert. In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission s" a Seventhday Adventist was discharged when she refused to work on Saturday,
her Sabbath. 1 9 Hobbie applied for unemployment benefits, but the
benefits were denied. The Florida courts refused her request for relief,
but the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Hobbie was a forthright affirmance of both Sherbert and Thomas. 90
Thus, the doctrine seems to have survived until at least 1987, but it
may have met its demise in International Union.
B.

Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis Avoided by the Supreme
Court in International Union

In International Union, the union and its members relied on
Sherbert, arguing that the state's denial of food stamps to the strikers
amounted to an unconstitutional condition imposed on the exercise of
union members' right to associate.' 8 ' Upholding the challenged statute,
Justice White distinguished Sherbert, but in doing so he threatened to
limit Sherbert's effect to cases involving the right to free exercise of
02
religion.'
The Supreme Court often has relied on Sherbert as authority for
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,' 93 but the decision has
never been limited to cases involving the free exercise of religion. It
seems strange, therefore, that the Court should balk when confronted

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
"'Where

Id.
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Id. at 720.
480 U.S. 136 (1987).
Id. at 138.
In reaffirming Thomas, the Hobbie Court, quoting from Thomas, stated,
the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by

a religious faith ... a burden on religion exists.'" Id. at 141 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S.

at 717).
191.
192.
193.
408 U.S.

See Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 369 n.7 (1988).
See id.
See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 140; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18; Perry v. Sindermann,
593, 597 (1972).
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with the Sherbert rule in International Union. Despite the similarities
between the two cases,"" Justice White wrote that Sherbert was inapposite to the facts of International Union because Sherbert "'was decided in the significantly different context of a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" originating in the
Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.' ,,195 Thus, despite any prior thinking on the scope of Sherbert,
the decision seemingly is limited by International Union. Before International Union the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions applied
to the rights of association and the free -exercise of religion. After International Union, however, Sherbert may apply only to the free exercise of religion. If the doctrine does apply to cases other than those
involving the free exercise clause, the result in International Union
should have been different.
If an unconstitutional condition analysis had been applied in International Union, the Court probably would have concluded that
union workers were coerced into giving up their right to associate as
union members in order to receive food stamp assistance. 98 Instead,
the InternationalUnion Court relied on Zablocki v. Redhail,19' which
dictated equal protection analysis without consideration of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 9 In so doing, the Court exhibited
an apparent unwillingness to apply the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions.
The history of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been
eventful. After Frost v. Railroad Commission, 9 the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions became an effective tool for the Supreme Court
to use in protecting individual liberties. 200 Although it has fallen out of
use in many fundamental rights cases, the doctrine has retained its

194. The cases are essentially analogous but for the right alleged to be burdened by
the state action. In both cases, a worker was denied welfare benefits because of the exercise of his or her fundamental right. The Sherbert Court granted relief to the worker
based on the worker's right to free exercise of religion, but in InternationalUnion the
Court denied relief to the worker, despite the worker's claimed right to associate.
195. International Union, 485 U.S. at 369 n.7 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
475 (1977)).
196. While the workers technically were giving up only an incident of the right of
association, namely their right to strike as union members, this privilege is a significant
part of the right of association in union contexts, since the threat of strike is used as
leverage in negotiations with management.
197. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
198. See InternationalUnion, 485 U.S. at 364.
199. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
200. See O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443, 457 (1966) (identifying Frost as the "critical turning point"
in the evolution of the law of unconstitutional conditions).
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practical usefulness in first amendment cases, especially those involving the free exercise of religion.20 1
After InternationalUnion, the precise scope of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is unclear. Justice White refused to apply the
doctrine in International Union because the case did not involve a
"'governmental obligation of neutrality' "202 violating the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment. Justice White's
justification for ignoring the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
however, also makes that doctrine inapplicable to speech cases, such as
Speiser v. Randall.20 3 Furthermore, Justice White's language arguably
excludes all corporation cases, since they do not involve the requisite
governmental neutrality involved in religion cases. The Court's requirement of a "governmental obligation of neutrality" is inconsistent
with the theory of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, and will
remain a troubling precedent until further clarified by the Court in
later decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The full effects of InternationalUnion will not be known until it
is applied in subsequent cases, but it has clearly affected the important
concept of strict scrutiny under equal protection. In the Court's own
language, a burden must now have a "substantial impact" on a fundamental right in order to be unconstitutional. 20 4 Essentially, International Union permits any penalty on the exercise of a fundamental
right so long as the penalty does not deter the exercise of the right. If
the Court uses International Union as the standard in future cases
involving penalties on the exercise of fundamental rights, then it will
have effectively eviscerated Thompson and managed to replace strict
scrutiny review in penalty cases with the outcome-determinative rational basis test.
International Union also seems to have restricted application of
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. By requiring a "governmental obligation of neutrality," Justice White apparently limited the
doctrine to freedom of religion cases, and not to the first amendment
right of association implicated in International Union.
J. Thornton Kirby

201. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
202. InternationalUnion, 485 U.S. at 369 n.7 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,

475 n.8 (1977)).
203. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).

204. Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988).
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